New research indicates that crows are capable of matching stimuli on the basis of analogical relations: that is, similarity of size, color and shape. This may be the first evidence for spontaneous analogical reasoning outside of the primate order.
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Despite decades of research that has revealed tantalizing evidence for the presence of relational understanding in various primate species, some researchers claim that this capacity forms a fundamental divide between humans and all other species [1] . This conclusion -implying that Darwin was misinformed in his assertion of continuity between man and beast [2] -has met with resistance, subject to the accusation that some researchers are motivated by the desire to keep moving the goal posts so that no other species could ever challenge perceived human superiority. Those who support the idea of cognitive continuity have pushed back with increasing demonstrations of even more distantly related species evidencing abilities previously deemed unique to humans. As they report in this issue of Current Biology, Smirnova et al. [3] have followed suit with their new claim that crows are capable of analogical reasoning; that is, of understanding that the relationship between two or more objects is the same as, or different from, the relationship between two other objects.
What is important, and often missing from such claims, is a clear rationale for why we might expect to see ability X in species Y. Crows along with other corvids have recently provided some of the most impressive evidence for advanced cognitive abilities in the animal kingdom [4] . Such abilities may be attributed to their social lifestyle, but one cannot draw such a conclusion without comparison to other closely related species with lower levels of sociality. Such comparisons are largely lacking in the comparative literature. What the recent findings do convincingly demonstrate is that even species distantly related to humans may share an ability that is ranked among the highest in cognitive complexity and indeed is relatively late to develop in human ontogeny [5] [6] [7] , usually taken as a sign that the ability may have emerged relatively late in evolutionary history.
Thus, the claim for evidence of analogical reasoning in the crow deserves great scrutiny. In particular, the finding that crows performed equally as well on tests of analogical reasoning as they did on tests of perceptual similarity matching should be considered surprising. In fact, such a finding points to the possibility that the two subjects were using a simpler (non-relational) rule to solve both problems. It is possible that the crows did not view the stimuli as presenting two objects that could be related on the basis of a shared attribute, but instead viewed the stimuli as a single pattern that contained, for example, one or two colors. The work of Wright and colleagues [8, 9] on configural stimulus processing in the pigeon provides some indirect support for such a notion. In fact, given that pigeons have performed exceptionally well on sameness/difference tasks while apes have sometimes struggled (personal observations with chimpanzees and gorillas), it is possible that the bird brain, which differs quite significantly from the primate brain, processes stimuli in an altogether different manner.
It is unfortunate that Smirnova et al. [3] did not manipulate the stimulus configurations in ways that might have allowed them to determine the birds' reliance on features such as orientation of large and small objects. The authors' conclusions are fortunately supported by the finding that birds transferred from relational trials of different types: for example, from size manipulations to color manipulations to shape manipulations. In each of these types of task, however, a perceptual rule may have aided the discrimination process. For instance, all of the size trials were arranged in such a manner that the smaller shape was always to the right of the larger shape, while the two similarly sized shapes were aligned vertically side by side, thus creating a clear perceptual similarity between the sample and the correct comparison that did not necessitate processing the stimuli as 'two items that are not of the same size'. The same color versus different color comparison could also be achieved by following a simple rule labelled the 'perceptual processing account', such as 'one color in sample -choose one color in comparison'; alternatively 'two colors in sample -choose two colors in comparison'.
Although Smirnova et al. [3] would argue that this account is not conceptually distinct from their own interpretation that the birds were performing a relational judgment task, the two explanations for the 'positive' results rest on attributions of profoundly different cognitive capacities. For instance, the relational interpretation requires that the bird process the two objects in the sample stimulus as being two distinct objects that may, or may not, share an element, such as size or color. It rests upon the ability to reason about analogies -a capacity typically reserved for human adolescents and adults [5] [6] [7] . The perceptual processing account, in contrast, supposes only that the bird recognizes the presence or absence of certain perceptual features in the entire stimulus. It does not necessitate that the bird compute the presence of two objects or draw inferences about the relationship between them; rather, the bird is required only to choose the comparison stimulus that best matches the sample via the presence of similar physically observable characteristics.
A useful control condition not implemented in previous work would be to include single shapes that were colored in multi-color patterns such that the entire stimulus could contain two colors but still exemplify the 'same' relation (see Figure 1) , which would prevent the birds from using the rule suggested by the perceptual processing account. A shape condition could incorporate a larger shape filled with a pattern containing a smaller and different shape so to additionally manipulate the number of different shapes present in the 'same' stimuli.
Smirnova et al. [3] did include a quantity manipulation in the training of their birds, but they did not test the birds' relational understanding using such a variable. This is a pity, as requiring the birds to match samples that contained two arrays of the same or different quantities might have negated some of the concerns with the other experimental manipulations described above. A quantity condition could have provided a more convincing demonstration of relational matching due to the fact that different quantities of dots, for example, can be presented while manipulating the area and size of the dots, contrasting perceptual cues with quantity information [10] .
Future experiments should benefit from careful manipulations of stimulus configurations as in Wright's work [8, 9] while examining potential deficits in performance as a result. In addition, experiments should manipulate the number of shared features such that researchers can compare performance when correct and incorrect comparison stimuli share none to several physical features with the sample. In fact, in the first study of relational reasoning to manipulate pairs of same colored and shaped objects [11] I included stimuli that sometimes shared one or two elements with the sample (see Figure 2 ) and analysed the data according to whether the apes in that study were more likely to choose stimuli that shared such features. There were no differences in performance based on the presence or absence of shared features. Although this study, conducted over a decade ago, in retrospect also suffers from the same susceptibility to alternative accounts, the apes had to discriminate what was shared between the items in the sample (either color or shape) and choose the correct alternative from an incorrect comparison that included two items that shared the opposite dimension, thus making a more compelling case for attending to a specific relation. Pepperberg's [12] innovative work with Alex, the grey parrot, also allowed the parrot to indicate what dimension (color, shape, material) was the same between different pairs or sets of objects, rather than simply choosing All of this is not to say that I believe that crows do not possess relational knowledge -they very well might. But it is to say that we must be cautious in granting abilities to animals that are interesting largely because they potentially break down the human erected divide between humans and other animals, and less so because they illuminate some aspect of animal cognition that explains that particular animal's umwelt. It has become something of a 'holy grail' type pursuit to find evidence for abilities that have served to enforce this divide, often times little justified by an interest in how that species solves problems presented in their evolutionary history or current environment. And, if we cannot conclusively demonstrate the presence of such traits against all alternative interpretations -some of them resting on simpler cognitive mechanisms -then we are dismantling Morgan's canon at the cost of maintaining theoretical rigor.
Cells respond to elevated temperatures through a well-characterized heat-shock response that enables short-term survival, long-term adaptation and mitigation of macromolecular damage. New work reveals a cell non-autonomous layer of stress-response regulation between neurons and the gonad involving serotonin.
Arjumand Ghazi and Todd Lamitina
Mechanisms that allow cells to sense and adapt to stress have been studied for decades. Classic work from the 1960s by the Italian scientist Ferruccio Ritossa serendipitously led to the discovery that cells activate a massive transcriptional response to elevated temperature, which we now refer to as the 'heat-shock response' [1] . Ultimately, these observations led to the discovery of the heat shock proteins (HSPs) and the key protein that activates HSP expression, the heat shock transcription factor (HSF). The study of HSPs and HSF has transformed our understanding of basic cell physiology, providing foundational insights into mechanisms of gene expression and protein translation, as well as protein folding and misfolding [2] . More recently, HSPs and HSF have emerged as potential points of intervention for treating a wide range of conditions involving the accumulation of damaged and denatured proteins, such as Alzheimer's disease, Huntington's disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and even the process of normal aging [3] . After Ritossa's early work on the Drosophila heat-shock response, the field focused on defining the mechanism of HSF activation. During this period, the cell was the major unit of study. What emerged was a homeostatic model in which HSF was retained in an inactive state via interaction with cytosolic chaperones. Stress induced the bulk misfolding of cytoplasmic proteins, which then competed with HSF for binding to a limited number of chaperones. With chaperones occupied with the refolding of client proteins, HSF gained access to the nucleus where it activated HSP gene expression. Increased HSP levels reduced the burden of misfolded proteins in the cytoplasm and restored the interaction between HSF and HSPs, thus closing the feedback loop and turning off the heat-shock response [4] . While some aspects of this model are at odds with experimental observations (for example, HSF is found predominantly within the nucleus before stress [5] ), the nature of the model is nonetheless entirely cellular, each cell acting on its own to detect stress-induced protein damage and restore homeostasis.
However, cells of metazoans do not exist alone but rather are part of a complex system that is subject to various modes of paracrine, endocrine, and neuronal regulation. How cellular stress responses are shaped by these additional layers of regulation remains largely unknown, but recent studies in the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans are beginning to shed light on these events. Previously, Prahlad, Cornelius and Morimoto [6] made the surprising discovery that two sensory neurons, called the AFD neurons, which enable thermotactic behavioral responses to temperature, are also required
